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ABSTRACT. The need for Canadian-American cooperative ocean management in the Arctic stems from four factors. Transboundary ocean currents 
have the potential to carry marine pollutants from one country to the other. Many living resources, such as bowhead and beluga whales, do not recognize 
political boundaries. Native communities depend culturally and economically on coastal resources. Technological collaboration in such areas as satellite 
communications and navigational aids is necessary to avoid costly duplications. 
Three documents - the World Conservation Strategy, the Report of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, and the Law  of the Sea 
Convention - bid the United States and Canada to join hands in managing resources in a more systematic manner. 
At least four jurisdictional issues concerning arctic waters are capable of rocking future US.-Canadian relations: the AlaskdYukon offshore 
boundary, the legal status of the waters of the Canadian arctic archipelago and the Northwest Passage, the legal principles governing the exclusive 
economic zones in the Beaufort, Chukchi, and Bering seas, and the legal regime applicable to arctic waters and the seabed beyond 200 nautical miles. 
Although cooperative ocean management may be hindered by national complexities, such as lack of clear arctic policies, fragmented decision-making 
processes, and tensions between government managers and local communities, the two countries should address eight threshold questions concerning 
future institutional linkages: Are present formal and informal arrangements adequate for arctic ocean management? What type or types of agreement - 
demonstrative, administrative, distributive, or resolutive - should be used to formalize cooperation? What level of cooperation - bilateral, trilateral, 
arctic-wide, or global - is required and politically feasible? Should the two countries create new management institutions or should they harmonize 
existing legislation and administration? Should one “super commission” be created with a say over all arctic marine issues or should a number of 
commissions be created for coordinating individual Ocean uses? Should joint institutions have advisory or actual decision-making powers? What role 
should native groups play in regionalized arctic marine management? What type of dispute-settlement mechanism(s) should be established? 
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RÉSUMÉ: Le besoin d’administration coopérative océanique canadienne américaine dans l’Arctique provient de quatre Cléments: les courants 
translimites de l’océan peuvent transporter les pollutants d’un pays à l’autre; un grand nombre de ressources vivantes comme la baleine ‘franche’ et le 
‘dauphin blanc’ ne distinguent pas les limites politiques; les communautés indigenes dépendent des ressources littoraux pour leur culture et leur économie; 
une collaboration technologique, par example dans les domaines de la communication satellite et les aides de navigation, est indispensable pour éviter 
des reproductions coûteuses. 
Trois documents proposent que les Etats-Unis et le Canada s’unissent afin de trouver un moyen plus systématique d’aménager leurs ressources: la 
Stratégie Mondiale de la Conservation (“World Conservation Strategy”), le Rapport de la Conf6rence des Nations-Unies sur l’environnement de 
l’homme (“Report of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment”)  et la Convention sur le Droit de la Mer  (“Law of the Sea  Cpnvention”). 
I1 y a au moins quatre points d’intérêts juridiques concernant les eaux arctiques qui peuvent compromettre les relations futures entre les Etats-Unis et le 
Canada: la delimitation de la frontiere maritime entre l’Alaska et le Yukon; la position légale des eaux de l’archipel canadien arctique et du Passage du 
Nord-Ouest; les principes juridiques qui gouvernent la zone économique exclusive des mers Beaufort, Chukchi et Bering; et le régime juridique qui 
s’applique aux eaux arctiques et le fond de la mer au-delà de 200 milles marins. 
Malgré que l’administration coopérative océanique peut être entravée par  des difficultés nationaux comme le manque de politique arctique précise, un 
processus fragmenté dans la manibre de prendre une décision,  et les tensions qui existent entre les managers du gouvernement et  les communautés 
locaux, - les deux pays devraient s’addresser aux huit questions de base sur l’avenir des liaisons institutionnels. 
Voici les huit questions de base: Les arrangements officiels et non-officiels qui existent h l’heure actuelle pour l’administration coopérative océanique 
sont-ils adéquates? Quel(s) genre ou genres d’accord(s) doit-on en arriver pour formaliser une collaboration, soit démonstrative, administrative, 
distributive ou résolutive? Quel niveau de collaboration, qui est en même temps politiquement acceptable, est requis: bilatéral, trilatéral, tout l’Arctique 
ou mondial? Les deux pays doivent-ils créer de nouveaux institutions administratives ou doivent-ils unir la législation et l’administration qui existent 
déjà? Doit-on créer une ‘super-commission’ avec voix dans tous les domaines  de l’arctique marine ou créer un certain nombres de commissions pour 
coordonner l’usage individuel de l’océan? Les institutions liées doivent-ils avoir le pouvoir juridique  àtitre consultatif ou délibératif? Quel rôle doivent 
jouer les groupes indigenes dans l’aménagement de l’arctique marine d’une région en particulier? Quel systeme de réglement des differends doit être 
établi? 
Mots clés: relations Canada-E.U., développement et gestion de l’océan, droit international de la mer 
INTRODUCTION 
A brooding sea - that describes the  present state of  American- 
Canadian  relations  in the Arctic, for bilateral relations ride an 
uneasy tension between continental cooperation and national 
conflict. Continental cooperation has occurred on numerous 
fronts. In the area  of defense,  major  American-Canadian  coop- 
eration, inaugurated  during  World  War II and strengthened with 
the creation of the North American Air Defense Command 
(NORAD) in 1957 (Kirton, 1984), has  taken  new strides in the 
1980s. Canada  and the United States have approved  a  compre- 
hensive North American Air Defense Master Plan and have 
agreed to upgrade  the Distant Early  Warning (DEW) line - the 
5800 km long chain of radar and communication stations 
extending from  Alaska  to  eastern Greenland  (Johnson et al . ,  
1984). Canada has also allowed  the  American cruise missile to 
be  tested over the Canadian North. 
Although  Canada’s 1980 National Energy  Program indicated 
strong feelings of nationalism, through such measures as the 
government  right to take a 25% back-in interest in  any frontier 
well  and the granting  of  petroleum incentives (paying  up to 80% 
of exploration costs) to operators depending on the level of 
Canadian ownership, the government  of  Prime Minister Brian 
Mulroney,  elected  September  1984,  has  reemphasized 
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continentalism by dismantling the National Energy Program 
and  supporting greater economic cooperation with  the  United 
States. In  March 1985 Prime Minister Mulroney  and President 
Ronald Reagan convened a “Shamrock Summit” to discuss 
bilateral issues and to reaffirm commitments to the principle 
of “good neighborliness. ” Both  governments  began negotia- 
tions  on a free  trade  agreement  in  May 1986. 
National  differences,  however,  continue  to  abound. 
Transboundary resource conflicts span the breadth  of  the 49th 
parallel and  include  such  issues  as fisheries management  in the 
Gulf  of Maine/Georges Bank region, water quality of the Great 
Lakes, the Garrison Dam proposal near the ManitobdNorth 
Dakota border, and salmon management on the West Coast 
(Carroll, 1983). In  August 1985, aU.S. CoastGuardicebreaker, 
Polar  Sea, re-aroused  Canadian  nationalism  by  not requesting 
Canadian  permission to transit the Northwest Passage. On 10 
September 1985 External  Affairs Minister Joe  Clark  reacted  by 
declaring Canadian sovereignty  over arctic waters  through the 
establishment of straight baselines (effective 1 January 1986) 
around  the  Canadian arctic archipelago (Clark, 1985). 
A developmental  ‘‘high pressure” system looms  on the arctic 
horizon, which  may  soon force greater bilateral cooperation. In 
the U.S. Beaufort Sea, three federal-related offshore lease sales 
for oil and  natural  gas  tracts  have  occurred - on 1 1  December 
1979,13 October 1982, and 22 August 1984. Federal lease sales 
are  also  proposed for July 1987 and  May 1990. A  300-million- 
barrel oil find  by Shell at Seal Island about 19 km northwest of 
Prudhoe  Bay  has  heightened industry’s interest. Canadian oil 
companies  -Dome, Esso, and  Gulf - have submitted propos- 
als to produce and transport Beaufort Sea hydrocarbons by 
utilizing  an  overland pipeline or giant Class 10 tankers. Panarctic 
Oils Ltd. shipped  the  first  tanker  load  of  oil  produced from the 
Bent Horn field on Cameron Island in the High Arctic in 
September 1985, and it is conceivable that small-scale seasonal 
shipments  of  oil  through the Passage  could open the  way for 
year-round  vessel traffic. 
This paper provides a legal perspective on bilateral ocean 
development and management issues through  a four-part 
discussion: the  need for international cooperation, international 
legal issues in the Arctic, national complications in ocean 
management, and  basic  policy questions for an arctic manage- 
ment regime. 
THE  NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL  COOPERATION 
The need for binational  ocean  management derives from  a 
combination  of physical, biological, human, and technological 
factors. The Beaufort  Sea Gyre,  a circular rotation of offshore 
waters, and a transboundary drift of  nearshore currents have the 
potential to carry marine pollutants such as spilled hydrocarbons 
from the waters of one country to the other (Giovando and 
Herlinveaux, 1981). Many arctic mammals, fish, and  birds do 
not “belong” to any given nation state and do not recognize 
political boundaries. Bowhead  and  beluga (white) whales, for 
example, migrate  from  wintering  areas  in the Bering Sea 
eastward around the northwestern Alaska coast and into the 
Canadian  Beaufort  and  Amundsen  Gulf  regions (Fraker, 1979). 
The Inuit  Circumpolar  Conference  has emphasized the common 
cultural heritage  of  northern  native peoples and  has  highlighted 
the need for regional cooperation in scientific research and 
marine wildlife management (Inuit Circumpolar  Conference, 
1983). Technological  collaboration is necessary  to  avoid costly 
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duplications in  such  areas  as satellite communication and navi- 
gational technologies and to facilitate standardization of 
icebreaking  vessel  designs (Amaria et al . ,  1977). 
Three international documents, in particular, have erected 
legal or ethical guideposts  bidding the United States and 
Canada  to join hands, on  occasion  with other nations, in order to 
manage  marine  resources in a more systematic  manner. 
The World  Conservation  Strategy 
The World  Conservation Strategy, a major report prepared by 
the International Union for the  Conservation of Nature  (IUCN) 
and commissioned by the United Nations Environment Pro- 
gramme (UNEP), names the Arctic Ocean a priority sea and 
intimates arctic nations  should develop binational or regional 
arrangements to facilitate environmental  conservation on  three 
fronts (International Union for the Conservation of Nature, 
1980). Measures, including joint research, should be under- 
taken to improve protection of migratory species breeding 
within the Arctic and wintering inside or outside the region. 
Studies should  be  carried  out on the  impact  of fisheries and other 
economic  activities on northern  ecosystems  and  non-target 
species. The arctic  nations  should consider  developing agree- 
ments for the conservation  of  vital  biological resources, based 
on  the  model  of  the r gional Agreement on the Conservation of 
Polar Bears. 
The ethical mandate implicit in  the language may take a step 
forward toward greater fruition through the holding  of a World 
Conservation  Strategy  conference  in  Canada in June 1986. 
Report of the UN Conference  on  the  Human  Environment 
The 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environ- 
ment,  a great oracle of recommendations  urging governments to 
initiate programs  to  protect  the  environment  on  numerous fronts 
from  pesticide  regulation  to  waste recycling, issued a  number of 
broad  recommendations  holding  potential applicability to inter- 
national  relations in the Arctic on at least five fronts. Recom- 
mendations 37 and 38 of the Action Plan for the Human 
Environment urge governments, through international agree- 
ments, to protect internationally significant ecosystems and  to 
cooperate in managing contiguous protected zones. Recom- 
mendations 32 and 50 urge governments to cooperate in protect- 
ing  living  resources - species migrating  from one  country to 
another and  transboundary fish stocks. Governments are bid to 
establish joint fishery councils or  commissions in regions where 
none exist. Recommendation 48 urges international cooperation 
in  studying  and  regulating industrial activities in one  country 
affecting  aquatic  resources  in another  country - for example, 
transboundary  effects on estuaries and  tidal marshes,  important 
habitats for marine fish stocks, and transboundary effects of 
toxic chemical discharges. Recommendation 5 1 urges states to 
create commissions to coordinate shared waterresources through 
such  means  as  cooperative environmental assessments and 
water  quality  control programs. Principle 22 of the Declaration 
on the Human  Environment  bids states to develop  compensation 
schemes for victims  of  transboundary pollution (United Nations, 
1972). 
The Law of the  Sea Convention 
Even though  the legal status of  the  Law  of the Sea  Convention 
may  remain  uncertain  in international law, since the U.S. is not 
a signatory  and  the  required 60 ratifications for a binding treaty 
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have  not  yet  been attained, the  convention contains a number of 
provisions  calling for a new vision  of  Arctic  Ocean management. 
First, states are  urged  to cooperate in  managing transboundary 
living resources. Article 63 requires  states  to coordinate man- 
agement  of  overlapping fish stocks  within the exclusive  eco- 
nomic  zones (EEZs) or of  fish  stocks straddling the EEZ and 
high seas. Article 66 requires  states  to cooperate in conserving 
and  managing  transboundary  anadromous  stocks (those fish  that 
spawn in rivers and spend much of adult life at sea, such as 
Arctic char). Article 65 requires  states to cooperate in conserv- 
ing marine mammals and in the case of cetaceans (whales, 
porpoises, dolphins) requires states to work for conservation 
through  appropriate  international organizations. 
Second, states are mandated to cooperate in protecting the 
marine environment. Articles  207  and  208 reiterate the  need to 
harmonizqmarine pollution  policies for land-based sources  and 
seabed  activities respectively, not  only  at  the global level but 
also  at a regional level. Article  210 requests states to establish 
global  and  regional  rules to control  ocean dumping. Article 21 1 
requires states to  establish  international  rules to control vessel- 
source  pollution  and to promote  routing systems to minimize the 
threat of accidents. Article  212 asks states, through global and 
regional rules, to endeavor to control atmospheric pollution of 
the  marine environment. Article  200  requires tates to cooperate 
in scientific research of marine pollution, while Article 201 
requires states to cooperate in establishing scientific criteria for 
the  formulation of rules  and  recommended practices to control 
marine  environmental pollution. 
Third, states are commanded by Article 243 to cooperate, 
through  bilateral or multilateral agreements, to create favorable 
conditions for marine scientific research and to integrate the 
work  of  scientists  studying  ocean phenomena. 
If the  Arctic  Ocean is considered  to  be a  semi-enclosed sea - 
as suggested by at least one writer (Alexander, 1974), but 
debated  by  others (Harden, 1986) -then Article 123 urges  all 
littoral states to cooperate in coordinating conservation and 
exploitation of  living resources, protection of the marine envi- 
ronment, and  scientific  research policies and programs. 
INTERNATIONAL  LEGAL  ISSUES 
At least four jurisdictional questions  concerning arctic waters 
are capable of  rocking or capsizing future U.S.-Canadian 
relations: the AlaskdYukon offshore boundary, the legal status 
of  the  waters of the Canadian arctic archipelago and the North- 
west Passage, the legal principles governing the exclusive 
economic  zones (EEZs) in  the Beaufort,  Chukchi, and  Bering 
seas, and the legal regime governing arctic waters and the 
seabed  beyond 200 nautical  miles. 
The  AlaskalYukon  OfSshore Boundary 
Canada  wishes to extend  the land boundary  between Alaska 
and  Yukon into the  Arctic  Ocean as the appropriate maritime 
boundary.  A Canadian claim to the 141st meridian W  longitude 
as  an offshore  boundary, although  hinted at in various official 
statements and  early  government maps, became crystal clear in 
1965  and  onward (Pharand,  1984, 1986). In January  1965, the 
Department  of  Northern  Affairs  and  Natural Resources began to 
issue  oil  and  gas exploration permits  in the Beaufort Sea up to 
and along the 141st meridian. The Arctic Waters Pollution 
Prevention Act, passed by Parliament in 1970, declared the 
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141st  meridian  as  the  western  boundary  of a 100 nautical mile 
pollution  prevention  zone  in  Canadian arctic waters. In 1977, 
Canada  used  the  141st  meridian  as the westerly limit to a 200 
nautical  mile fishing zone  in arctic waters. In a 1984  land claims 
agreement  with  the Inuvialuit of  the  Western Arctic, Canada 
used the 141st meridian as the westerly limit of aboriginal 
claims to offshore areas  of the Beaufort Sea  (Canada,  Depart- 
ment of Indian Affairs  and Nohhern  Development, 1984). 
On 1 November 1976, the  United States, in preparation for 
expanding fisheries jurisdiction out to 200 nautical miles, 
formally  published  the coordinates to an alternative Beaufort 
Sea  boundary  (United States Department  of State, 1976). Based 
on  the  principle of equidistance, the line was  drawn to the east of 
the  Canadian  line (Lawson, 1981). 
Since 1975  the  Beaufort  boundary  waters  have  been rather 
tranquil. Both  governments  have  imposed  an  informal  morato- 
rium on offshore exploration in the disputed area covering 
approximately  6180  square  nautical  miles  of seabed. In 1977, 
special negotiators, Marcel  Cadieux  of  Canada  and  Lloyd 
Cutler  of the United States, tried  to  reach a  package  agreement 
on all four disputed U.S .-Canadian marine boundaries, but 
when negotiations became too complex, the YukodAlaska 
offshore boundary and the two western boundaries of Dixon 
Entrance and Juan  de Fuca Strait were jettisoned until resolution 
of the Gulf  of  Maine line was  achieved (Wang, 1981). 
A solution to the boundary conflict has  been complicated by 
the lack of a ready-made set of international legal rules for 
maritime boundary delimitation (Legault and McRae, 1984). 
Article 6 of the 1958 Continental Shelf  Convention appeared to 
establish a  firm rule of equidistance (unless there  were special 
circumstances), but  the  Gulf  of  Maine decision, rendered by a 
Chamber of the International Court  of Justice in October  1984, 
indicated that equidistance may only be a practical method 
(Legault  and McRae, 1984). The  1982 Convention on the Law 
of the Sea, when referring to boundary delimitation of the 
exclusive economic  zone (Article 74) or continental shelf (Arti- 
cle 83), only sets forth the general principle that states must  seek 
to reach an agreement on the basis of international law to 
achieve an equitable solution. A further complication is that 
separate boundaries  could  be  drawn for the seabed  and  water 
column, although a single line is generally preferable to avoid 
administrative chaos (Legault  and Hankey, 1985). 
The Waters of the Canadian  Arctic  Archipelago  and  Northwest 
Passage 
The legal status of the waters within the Canadian arctic 
archipelago including the five basic routes of the Northwest 
Passage is perhaps the greatest potential irritant in U.S.- 
Canadian arctic relations, for the  waters  have  symbolized diver- 
gent interests for Canada  and the United States. Canadians tend 
to view the waters  with a coastal state perspective. The waters 
are part  of  the “Canadian  North,”  a land of adventure and early 
explorers, a land  of individualistic spirit, an historic homeland 
of  native people, and a unique  environment requiring special 
stewardship. Many Americans, meanwhile, tend to view the 
archipelagic waters  with a maritime perspective. The waters  not 
only represent a marine highway capable of reducing ocean 
transport  from U.S. ports  to  European or east coast markets by 
thousands  of kilometres, but also represent a  dangerous  dom- 
ino. The Canadian  move to increase jurisdictional control over 
the  Passage  might encourage  other states to expand claims  over 
archipelagic waters  and  international straits. 
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Such  divergent  perspectives  may continue to foster disparate 
national  viewpoints as to  the  legal status of the waters. Canada, 
by enclosing the waters of the Passage and archipelago with 
straight baselines, has formalized a claim to internal waters 
status and  complete  sovereignty  that  would include the right  to 
prohibit foreign vessel transits. However, the  United States may 
pose  at least two  major  arguments  in favor of increased transit 
rights for its vessels. First, to assert complete sovereignty 
including the right to prohibit foreign vessel transits Canada 
would  have to prove  an historic title to the water areas. Since 
one of Canada’s leading authorities on arctic waters’ status has 
indicated Canada may not be able to prove an historic title 
(Pharand 1984, 1986), Canada must rely on the doctrine of 
straight baselines  to establish internal waters status. Even assum- 
ing Canada could establish the three major requirements for 
drawing straight baselines - a coastal fringe of islands, lines 
enclosing water  with a close land-sea link, and lines not depart- 
ing  from the general direction of the coast (VanderZwaag and 
Pharand,  1983)  -both the 1958  Convention on the Territorial 
Sea and the 1982  Law of the Sea  Convention provide that  waters 
formerly considered as part of the territorial sea  or high seas 
would still be  subject  to the right  of  innocent passage.  The 1958 
Territorial Sea Convention defines innocent passage as not 
being prejudicial to  the “peace, good order  or security of the 
coastal state.”  The  1982  convention, in article 19, spells out 
what is not  innocent passage, such  as a willful act of  pollution or 
weapon exercises. 
The United States might  even go further and argue that the 
baselines  were  not justified and  that the Northwest Passage, in 
particular, is an international strait subject to almost complete 
freedom of air and  marine transit by user states. The Law  of the 
Sea Convention  allows a coastal state only minimal regulatory 
reins over international straits - the power to prescribe sea 
lanes and traffic separation schemes, the power to prohibit 
foreign fishing, and the power  to control the discharge of oil  and 
other noxious substances (in conformity with international 
standards). Submarines would  be allowed to  pass  through the 
strait in the submerged  mode (Moore, 1980; Pharand, 1984). 
Canada might counter with at least two major  arguments. 
First, even if Canada were not justified in claiming internal 
waters status based on historic title or straight baselines, com- 
plete sovereignty should arise over much of the water area 
because landfast ice is analogous  to  land territory (Boyd, 1984). 
Second, no  matter  what the legal status of  the waters, Article 
234  of the Law  of the  Sea  Convention grants a coastal state like 
Canada  broad  regulatory  powers  over commercial shipping in 
ice-covered waters, and the power may include the right to 
require special vessel design  standards (for example, hull con- 
struction and strength specifications) and special crewing quali- 
fications (for example, tankers are required to carry an ice 
navigator aboard if operating in any arctic zone) (Pharand, 
1979). 
The Beaufort, Chukchi,  and  Bering Seas 
At least two  major international legal issues loom  over the 
northern  waters  within  national jurisdiction to the west of the 
Northwest Passage. First, the future applicability of Article 234, 
the  Law of the Sea  Convention’s  provision  that grants coastal 
states broad  regulatory  powers over ice-covered waters, remains 
uncertain. 
Will Canada eventually apply the article beyond the present 
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100 nautical  mile  pollution  prevention  zone - that is, all  the 
way  out to 200  nautical  miles?  Will  the U. S.  eventually wish  to 
invoke special Article 234 shipping controls if other nations 
such  as  Japan or Canada initiate major  marine  transport  along 
the western Alaska seaboard? What is the southern extent of 
ice-covered waters, assuming the U.S. did wish to impose 
stringent shipping controls? How is “ice-covered for most of 
the year” to be defined? Does  ice-covered  mean 100 percent 
coverage,  90 percent coverage,  or perhaps  any  amount over 50 
percent?  Is  most of the year  to  be defined by a single heavy-ice 
year or by  an  average  of ice years? 
Second, what  marine scientific researchregime will  be  applied 
to  the  waters? The United States, although  following a consent 
regime for marine research in the territorial sea and on the 
continental shelf, has  refrained  from claiming jurisdiction over 
scientific research in the EEZ. Canada  has established a consent 
regime for marine  scientific  research  in the economic zone, but, 
as yet, has  not  formalized  the  process  through exclusive  eco- 
nomic  zone  legislation (Underwood, 1984). The  question should 
be  raised  whether  Canada  and  the  United States wish  to  follow a 
standard consent regime for arctic research. On the positive 
side, such a regime  ensures  coastal state interests and assures 
maximum  consultation  and  input for coastal state agencies. On 
the negative side, a consent  regime  may engender bureaucratic 
delays  and  increase administrative costs. Possible alternatives 
to a full-blown consent regime include establishment of a 
simplified notification  scheme  or a binational commission to 
give streamlined  review to research projects (Mangone, 1981). 
Legal  Regime beyond 200 Nautical Miles 
The Seaward Delimitation of the Continental Shelf: The 
delimitation of the outer  limit  of the continental shelf  will likely 
not raise a major  political  tempest  in U.S.-Canadian relations 
for one  basic reason. Most  of  the continental shelf  in the Arctic 
is located  within  the  internationally  accepted  200 nautical mile 
exclusive economic  zones (Pharand, 1981). 
The legal status of two  Arctic  Ocean  ridges -the Lomonosov 
Ridge, running  from offshore North  Greenland  and across the 
North Pole, and  the  Alpha Ridge, located  off  Northern Ellesmere 
Island - could also raise international murmurings. Article 
76(6) of the Law of the Sea Convention  may  allow coastal states 
to claim seabed jurisdiction beyond 350 nautical miles on 
submarine ridges  that  are continental and  not oceanic in origin. 
Although still uncertain, the Lomonosov  Ridge appears to be 
continental in  origin and, thus, the Soviet  Union,  Canada, and 
possibly  Greenland  (Denmark)  could  seek  to  extend jurisdiction 
on  the ridge beyond  the  200  nautical  mile limit (Pharand, 1984). 
Preliminary  reports  from the Canadian  Expedition to Study the 
Alpha  Ridge (CESAR), which  gathered scientific information 
over the ridge in spring 1983, indicate an oceanic origin 
(Halifax Chronicle-Herald, 1984). 
Seabed Jurisdiction beyond  National  Zones: Assuming the 
deep arctic seabed eventually becomes economically attractive 
as an exploration area for marine resources - an unlikely 
possibility  according to some  analysts (Pharand,  1984), what is 
to be the applicable legal regime? At least three possibilities 
exist. First, the  arctic  seabed  could  be considered the common 
heritage of  mankind  and thus subject  to the deep  seabed provis- 
ions of the  Law of the  Sea Convention. Pursuant to the conven- 
tion, the International Seabed  Authority  would regulate envi- 
ronmental consequences  of  seabed activities, limit the level of 
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mineral production, and carry out equitable sharing of financial 
benefits. Marine  scientific  research  would  remain open to all 
states. 
Second, the  deep  seabed  could  be  considered a part of the 
high seas and thus open to exploitation by any state having 
appropriate  technological capabilities. The U.S., of course, has 
supported  such  an  approach in other ocean areas through three 
major steps -by refusing  to  sign  the  Law  of the Sea  Conven- 
tion, by  passing  the  Deep  Seabed  Hard Minerals  Resources  Act, 
which legislatively recognizes the high seas status of deep 
seabed  mineral resources, and by signing a  “Provisional  Under- 
standing  Regarding  Deep  Seabed Matters” with several other 
states, including  the U.K. and  West Germany, for resolution  of 
seabed  mining conflicts. 
Third, the  five littoral arctic states, based  on the principles of 
proximity and special arctic circumstances, could establish a 
separate regional exploration and exploitation regime. 
Vessel Management for Arctic  Waters beyond 200 Nautical 
Miles: It  is  tempting for arctic researchers to become fixated on 
transit  management questions in  the  Northwest Passage for two 
reasons. The Passage  has  been a critical issue  in U . S . -Canadian 
relations, and  the  Passage  represents a rather romantic subject. 
Explorers  since  John  Cabot in 1497 have  been fascinated with 
the tremendous  possibilities of opening up a  shortened  sea route 
to the Orient. 
However, vessel transit over the North Pole also holds 
potential. On 16 August 1977, the Soviet  icebreaker Arktika, 
travelling at  an  average  speed  of 11.5 knots, became the first 
surface vessel  to  reach  the  North  Pole  and  proved  the feasibility 
of transpolar surface transit. In early 1986, the Soviets 
announced  plans  to  begin  using  the transpolar route for shipping 
for as  much  as  five  months of every year  (Halifax Chronicle- 
Herald, 1986). A North  Pole  Passage offers tremendous reduc- 
tions in shipping distances between major world ports. For 
example, the approximate distances between Vancouver and 
Rotterdam  could  be  reduced  from 19 310 to 14 OOO km, Van- 
couver to Murman6k  from 22 530 to 12 060 km, and  Yokohama 
to  Rotterdam  from 28 970 to 12 550 km. Transit via the North 
Pole route could  reduce  voyage  duration  by a half to a quarter of 
present  open-sea  routes (Harrison, 1981). 
Given  the  oceanographic current patterns  in the Arctic Ocean, 
an oilspill or other  hazardous cargo  accident along a High Arctic 
transportation  route  could impact the waters  of the U.S., Can- 
ada, or other arctic nations. Therefore, the polar nations might 
eventually wish  to  address the question of  an appropriate legal 
regime. 
Two major  possibilities exist for jurisdictional status. First, 
the area could  be  considered  part  of the high seas and thus each 
nation-state would impose, according to international stan- 
dards, shipping restrictions on its  own flag vessels. Second, the 
area could be considered sui generis, that is, a unique .area 
bidding the five arctic littoral states - the U.S. ,  Canada, 
DenmarWGreenland, Norway, and the Soviet Union - to reach 
agreement as to  the  appropriate  vessel design, cargo limits, and 
crewing  requirements to assure coastal states are not  adversely 
impacted by transpolar  commercial shipments. 
NATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS 
Lack of Clear Arctic  Ocean  Policies 
Neither  the U.S. nor  Canada  has  yet formulated clear, 
comprehensive visions of how,  when, and  where arctic offshore 
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resources should be developed and transported. The United 
States’ lack  of a clear policy  vision  might  be explained by  at 
least two  major factors. First, the U.S. has traditionally devoted 
minimal attention to arctic policy formulation (Pollack and 
Anderson, 1973; Smith, 1978). Not until December 1971 did 
the United States actually  attain a statement  of national arctic 
policy. Through  National Security Decision  Memorandum 144 
President Richard Nixon established four broad principles: 
rational  development  of arctic resources, minimal adverse envi- 
ronmental effects, international cooperation in the Arctic, and 
protection  of  security  interests  including  the  principle  of free- 
dom  of the seas  and  superadjacent airspace (Kildow, 1985). He 
also established  the  Interagency  Arctic  Policy Group  (IAPG), 
chaired  by  the  Department of State and including the Depart- 
ments  of Defense, Interior, Commerce  and Transportation, the 
National Science  Foundation, and the Council  on Environmen- 
tal Quality, to coordinate U. S. arctic programs. In a report of 22 
October 1982, the group noted that numerous arctic policy 
questions still face the U . S . , including the level of federal effort 
required, such as search  and  rescue  support  and  weather  and  ice 
forecasting, in relation to domestic and foreign offshore devel- 
opment. After  reviewing  the report, President  Reagan  affirmed 
the broad principles established  in the 1971 National Security 
Memorandum and authorized the Interagency Arctic Policy 
Group to undertake  two  priority  reviews - of how the United 
States should coordinate arctic activities with other countries 
and of the  proper  level  of federal services for resource  develop- 
ment (U.S. Department of State, 1983). The latter review is to 
recognize that resource development is primarily a private 
sector activity. Not  until 1968 did the U.S. establish a formal 
mechanism,  the  Interagency  Arctic  Research Coordinating Com- 
mittee (IARCC), to coordinate scientific research  in the Arctic. 
However, in the absence of a guiding research policy, the 
IARCC foundeied and  was  formally  disbanded  in June 1978, 
leaving coordination for polar research largely at the agency 
level. Not until late July 1984 did Congress finally pass the 
Arctic  Research  and  Policy Act, establishing an  Arctic  Research 
Commission  and  an  Interagency  Arctic  Research  Policy  Com- 
mittee, which  could  be catalysts for developing an  integrated 
arctic science policy. 
A second  reason for the lack of a clear policy  vision by the 
United States is  likely  the “knowledge  gap” as  to arctic 
offshore resources and preferable transportation mode. Until 
firm answers  are  gained on the commercial viability of offshore 
hydrocarbons  and  until  industry  decides on the preferred  type of 
transportation, such as pipelines, tankers, or  a  combination of 
the two, government  has little incentive to engage in massive 
program  and  policy development. Although  the federal govern- 
ment  has supported  a number of arctic science programs  such  as 
the Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Assessment Pro- 
gram  (OCSEAP) in the  Beaufort Sea, a joint program  by  the 
Bureau of Land  Management  (now Minerals Management Ser- 
vice) and the National  Oceanic  and  Atmospheric Administra- 
tion  to  provide  the  necessary  baseline  data for environmental 
impact statements, the overall level  of unding for arctic research 
has  been relatively low (U.S. Senate  Hearings, 1982) and arctic 
research  has  taken  somewhat  of a back seat to Antarctic  research 
(Kildow, 1985). 
Canada, while certainly paying greater attention to arctic 
policy  formation  than the United States, has developed such a 
fragmented array of sectoral policies as to leave substantial 
uncertainty  to the schedule and scale of arctic offshore  resource 
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development (VanderZwaag and Lamson, 1986). Perhaps the 
only  firm  verbal  statement  of  the  policy  confusion is to describe 
government’s overall policy as “the creative search for bal- 
anced development.” Indeed, former Prime Minister Pierre 
Trudeau  clearly  stated the lack  of a  comprehensive  development 
plan in favor of creative evolution: 
You have overall plans in totalitarian societies. They don’t work 
well and when they don’t it’s because they bend the people into 
the will of the plan. . . . We feel that the creative evolution of 
thinking and acting is the best approach to developing the North. 
[Munro, 1983.1 
The Beaufort Sea Environmental Assessment Panel in its 
policy recommendations to the federal government in early 
1984 cast uncertainty  over  marine  transportation  of arctic hydro- 
carbons, in particular, by stating a preference for a small- 
diameter buried pipeline and  by  recommending the government 
of Canada  withhold  approval  of the tanker  option  until after two 
evaluation stages. A research  and  preparation stage would focus 
on such questions as the effect of tanker traffic on marine 
mammals  and  the  need for increased  government  support sys- 
tems  such  as  hydrographic charts and ice detection systems.  A 
two  tanker  stage  would  involve  actual  field trials and  perfor- 
mance studies of two Arctic Class 10 oil-carrying tankers 
(Canada,  Federal  Environmental  Assessment and Review 
Office, 1984). 
Fragmented  National Decision-Making  Processes 
Binational  cooperation  in  northern  ocean development and 
management may also be complicated by political or legal 
tensions  in  national decision-making processes  on  at least three 
levels - federal jurisdictional overlaps, federal-state/territorial 
tensions, and  governmental-community relations. 
Federal Jurisdictional Overlaps: Both  the U.S. and  Canada 
face fragmented decision-making processes for dealing with 
marine-related issues  at  the federal level. In the United States 
some 21 organizations in 6 departments and 5 agencies are 
responsible for aspects of  marine science and oceanic regula- 
tion. Besides the Department  of Interior and NOAA, the  Depart- 
ment of State, the  Environmental  Protection Agency, the  Depart- 
ment of Defense, the  Army  Corps  of Engineers, the Department 
of Energy, and the Coast Guard all play key roles in ocean 
affairs. Such bureaucratic fragmentation is complemented by 
Congressional fragmentation.  Over 30 subcommittees in  both 
branches of Congress have jurisdiction over some aspect of 
ocean affairs (King, 1978). A U.S. Interagency Group on the 
Law  of the Sea does exist, however, for dealing with  law  of the 
sea issues and  lends  some structure to law of the sea delibera- 
tions by the Executive Branch (J.L. Malone, pers. comm. 
1984). 
In Canada, control over offshore resource development is 
fragmented  primarily  over 7 federal entities, the Department  of 
Indian Affairs  and  Northern Development,  Transport Canada 
(and the Coast Guard), External Affairs, the Department of 
Fisheries and Oceans, Environment Canada, the Canada Oil  and 
Gas Lands  Administration (COGLA), and the National  Energy 
Board. At least 13 major pieces of federal legislation apply 
directly to aspects  of  northern marine management: the Arctic 
Waters  Pollution  Prevention Act, the  Canada Shipping  Act, the 
Migratory  Birds  Convention Act, the Canada Wildlife  Act, the 
Ocean  Dumping  Control Act, the Fisheries Act, the Navigable 
Waters  Protection Act, the  Canada Oil and Gas  Act, the Oil  and 
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Gas Production and Conservation Act, the Territorial Lands 
Act, the Public  Lands Grant  Act, the  National  Parks Act, and 
the National Energy Board Act (VanderZwaag and Lamson, 
1986). 
Such fragmented  and  often uni-sectoral decision-making 
processes raise at  least  two questions for U.S.-Canadian  cooper- 
ative  ocean  development  and  management. First, is it possible 
to achieve rational management at the binational level when 
rational ocean  management  at  the  national  level  has  been  more a 
dream  than a reality? Second, the  complexity of national  ocean 
management  regimes  raises  the difficult two-part  question of 
which federal agencies should be represented on binational 
decision-making  or  advisory  committees  and  what proportion of 
membership  should each agency enjoy? 
Federal-StatelTerritorial Tensions: Legal  and political ten- 
sions over  northern offshore issues exist for the  United States 
and Canada at the state and territorial levels respectively. 
Tensions between Alaska and the federal government have 
existed on at least  two fronts. First, what  is  the geographical 
extent of Alaskan offshore jurisdiction? While the Submerged 
Lands  Act  gave  most states jurisdiction over  waters  and  sub- 
merged lands out to 3 nautical miles off their coastlines, the 
question  remains of from  where the coastline should  be  mea- 
sured. Alaska  and the U.S. are  presently litigating the question 
of territorial sea delimitation  off  the  mainland shore in the Arctic 
Ocean  before  the U.S. Supreme Court. Alaska  wishes to draw 
straight baselines  around  the  outer perimeter of a number of 
islands  lying  more  than 6 nautical  miles  from shore, while the 
U.S.  claims delimitation  should follow the coastline and  thus 
high  seas  enclaves exist between  the  islands (Chamey, 1983). If 
the U.S. in the future extends its territorial sea from 3 to 12 
nautical miles, coastal states, such  as Alaska, could argue for a 
seaward extension  of state control over  offshore  resources as 
well (Seymour, 1977). A second level of state/federal tension 
exists over state rights to manage activities beyond the territorial 
sea. Federal statutes, such as the Coastal Zone Management 
Act, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, the Deepwater 
Ports Act, and  the  Magnuson  Fishery  Conservation  and  Man- 
agement Act, provide  varying degrees of state influence  over 
federal  actions  in  the  EEZ  ranging from consultation to direct 
review  and  approval  (Center for Ocean Management Studies, 
1983). However, state and local governments have desired a 
greater role in decision-making, particularly concerning the 
pace of offshore oil and gas exploration and development 
(Jones, 1984). 
In Canada, federal-territorial tensions are more political than 
legal. On the legal side, Yukon’s offshore jurisdiction stands 
rather certain. Yukon’s  territory includes all  islands  within 20 
statute miles  from  the shores of the Beaufort Sea  (Nicholson, 
1979). This area includes  Herschel Island, an important early 
whaling center and an area still rich with abundant marine 
mammal resources, and the Territorial government has indi- 
cated  an  intent  to establish a Territorial Historic Park, which 
might eventually incorporate a marine  component (Government 
of Yukon, 1980). The  Northwest Territories, meanwhile, holds 
at least a slight legal  lever for claiming offshore jurisdiction 
since the  Northwest Territories Act, the federal statute estab- 
lishing territorial powers, provides  an  ambiguous definition of 
Territories that  could  be  interpreted to include all ice, water, and 
land north of the 60th parallel. Section 2 of the act states: 
“ ‘Territories’  means  the  Northwest Territories which comprise 
. . . all that part of  Canada  north of the Sixtieth Parallel of  North 
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Latitude, except  the  portions . . . within  the  Yukon Territory, 
the  Province of Quebec or the  Province  of  Newfoundland. . . . ” 
At  least  two  cases  have  upheld  Territorial jurisdiction over  the 
offshore. In R.  v. Tootalik E4-321, the  Territorial  court  upheld 
the  prosecution of a Spence  Bay  resident for unlawfully  hunt- 
ing, while  on  the  sea ice, a female  polar  bear  with  young. In BP 
Exploration Co. (Libya)  Ltd. v. Hunt, the  Northwest  Territo- 
ries  Supreme  Court  allowed  an  injunction  preventing the defen- 
dant from  disposing of exploration  permits for land  under  the 
Beaufort Sea. The Northwest Territories, using the powers 
granted by the Northwest Territories Act over such facets as 
direct  taxation  and  matters of a local or private nature, could 
argue  (and  has  argued) for a share of revenues from offshore 
activities.  However,  such a legal  lever  could  be  snapped  at  any 
moment, for Parliament  retains the latent  power  to  clarify the 
statutory  language. 
On the political side, both the Northwest Territories and 
Yukon  continue  to  push for full  provincehood.  Political  evolu- 
tion  in the N.W.T. has  taken  important  strides ince 1979 when 
C.M. Drury, the Prime Minister’s special representative on 
constitutional  development  on  the  Northwest Territories, urged 
a greater  role  for  northern  residents  in  determining the political 
future (Drury, 1980). On 14 April 1981 a majority of N.W.T. 
residents (56%) voted to divide the Territories into two - a 
western territory and an eastern territory (called Nunavut). 
Following the plebiscite, the N.W.T. Legislative Assembly 
unanimously endorsed division, and in November 1982 the 
Minister  of  Indian  Affairs  and  Northern  Development  announced 
support in principle for division, subject to four conditions, 
including the settlement  of  native  land claims and  agreement 
among  northern  residents  on  political  boundaries (Shenvood, 
1986). On 28 March  1984  Cabinet  approved a final land claims 
agreement  with  Inuvialuit  in the Western  Arctic.  Negotiations 
are  continuing  between  the  federal  government  and  the  Tungavik 
Federation of Nunavut (TFN) over areas of the Central and 
Eastern Arctic. In Yukon, self-government has been a para- 
mount  objective  of every government since the establishment  of 
Yukon in 1898. Perhaps the overall political mood in Yukon 
was  captured  in the words of government leader Chris Pearson 
in a statement  setting  forth a new  government Land Use  Policy: 
The rallying cry of each Yukon Government has been that 
Yukoners, not people living in Ottawa, should be making 
decisions that affect us at the  territorial  level.  The  feeling of 
Yukoners was most aptly described by Commissioner  Gordon 
when  he said, ‘You can’t drive a team of horses with reins 3,000 
miles long’. . . . My Government  will not be  satisfied until our 
land is owned  and  managed by Yukoners. . . . [Government of 
Yukon, 1982.1 
Such federal-state/territorial tensions, touched  on above, 
raise an important twofold question for cooperative ocean 
management  between  the U.S. and Canada. What role should 
state  and  territorial  representatives  play  in  any  decision-making 
and  advisory  bodies  created o facilitate cooperation, and  assum- 
ing there is representation, which state or territorial agencies 
should  be  represented  on  such  bodies? 
Governmental-Community Relations: Both  the U.S. and  Can- 
ada  also face political  and  legal  tensions  between  government 
managers and local communities in the North. Judicial pro- 
nouncements and federal legislation in both countries have 
generally  crowned  federal  administrators “rulers” of  the sea. 
Inuit communities, on the other hand, reliant on arctic seal,  fox, 
polar bear, and whale  populations,  have  lived  in  concert  with 
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the  natural  rhythms  of  sea  ice  regimes for centuries. A dynamic 
tension has thus been established between federal managers, 
who often  view  the  “national  interest” as maximizing  oil  and 
gas  development  or  maximizing  multiple  ocean uses, and  Inuit 
communities, which,  while  not  necessarily  opposing  offshore 
development,  wish  to  maximize  opportunities to sustain  their 
cultural heritage, represented in part by renewable resource 
harvesting  activities. 
In  the  United States, the  political  tension  has  been  played  out 
on at  least four fronts. First, the  Inupiat  of  Alaska’s  North Slope 
litigated unsuccessfully at the District Court and Court of 
Appeal levels the question of rights over sea ice, water, and 
submerged  lands  in  the  Beaufort  and  Chukchi seas beyond  the 
three-mile  limit. Second, the  North Slope Borough  has  formu- 
lated a Coastal  Zone  Management Plan, which if approved  at  the 
federal  level  will  become a district  component  of  the  Alaska 
Coastal Management Program. The plan could provide some 
leverage  over  federal  offshore developments, for Section  307 of 
the Federal  Coastal Zone Management  Act  requires  all  federal 
activities  “directly  affecting”  the  coastal  zone to be  consistent 
to the maximum extent practicable with an approved state 
coastal  management  plan. Third, the Alaska Eskimo Whaling 
Commission  (AEWC)  has  been  granted joint management 
responsibilities with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration  over  bowhead whaling. Fourth, the Native 
Claims Review Commission has recently released a report 
criticizing  the  1971  Alaska  Native Claims Settlement Act 
(Berger, 1985). 
In Canada, the major  mechanisms for securing a community 
hand over offshore development have been participation in 
government  environmental  assessment  reviews  and the negotia- 
tion  of  land  claims  settlements.  The  Beaufort Sea Environmen- 
tal  Assessment Panel, having  listened  to the social  and  cultural 
concerns of narive  northerners,  has  recently  recommended  that 
“governments  give  to the communities  and  local  hunters  and 
trappers a stronger role in harvesting studies and in fish and 
wildlife  resource  planning  and  decision-making” (Canada, 
Federal  Environmental  Assessment  and  Review Office, 1984). 
The recent  land claims agreement  signed by the  government of 
Canada  and  the  Inuvialuit  of the Western  Arctic  promises  to 
establish  several  new  resource  management  mechanisms  grant- 
ing  native  northerners  new  participation  rights  but  not  exclusive 
authority.  Wildlife  Management  Advisory Councils, one for the 
Yukon  North  Slope  and one for the  Northwest  Territories  with 
equal native and governmental representation, will provide 
advice on management of wildlife and wildlife habitat. An 
Inuvialuit Game Council, besides  assigning  community  hunting 
and  trapping areas and  providing  additional  advice  on  wildlife 
management, is to advise the government on any proposed 
Canadian  international  position  affecting  wildlife  in the settle- 
ment region and to provide membership for any Canadian 
delegation  dealing  with  international  matters  affecting 
Inuvialuit wildlife harvests. A Fisheries Joint Management 
Committee  will  advise  the  Minister  of  Fisheries  and Oceans on 
such  matters  as  harvestable  quotas formarine mammals, regula- 
tions  regarding  sport  and  commercial fishing, and  international 
agreements being developed that might apply to Inuvialuit 
fisheries. Community Hunters and Trappers Committees will 
sub-allocate  subsistence quotas. A Research  Advisory  Council 
will seek to coordinate research activities in the settlement 
region. 
One clause of the settlement agreement, in particular, 
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acknowledges  the  importance of facilitating transboundary man- 
agement  regimes: 
Canada undertakes to ensure that wildlife management and 
habitat management produce an integrated result with respect to 
migratory species within the Yukon Territory, the Northwest 
Territories and the adjacent offshore. In respect of migratory 
species which cross international boundaries (e.g. Porcupine 
Caribou herd), Canada shall endeavour to include the countries 
concerned in cooperative management agreements and arrange- 
ments designed to maintain acceptable populations in all juris; 
dictions affected, including safe harvesting levels within each 
jurisdiction. Canada shall endeavour to have within such agree- 
ments provisions respecting joint research objectives and related 
matters respecting the control of access to populations. [Canada, 
Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 
1984.1 
The  evolving political status of native northerners raises a 
number of questions for cooperative  ocean management  between 
the U.S. and Canada. What  role  should  native northerners play 
in  decision-making or advisory institutions created to facilitate 
binational (or multilateral) cooperation? What role should an 
umbrella organization, such  as  the Inuit Circumpolar  Confer- 
ence, play  in  binational (or multilateral) ocean management? 
POLICY  QUESTIONS  FOR  AN INTERNATIONAL 
ARCTIC MARINE MANAGEMENT REGIME 
Without clear national pictures of offshore development 
pace, transportation modes,  endpoints of territorial and  native 
political institutions, and priorities forrenewable  resource devel- 
opment  (such  as  marine  mammal harvesting and tourism) and 
non-renewable resource uses, it is extremely difficult to predict 
future international regulatory  needs  and  management possibili- 
ties  in  the North.  Nevertheless, this section provides an over- 
view of key policy questions involved in creating an arctic 
marine  management regime. Before  saying “I do” to increas- 
ing bilateral or multilateral  marine cooperation in the Arctic, 
Canada and the United States should address at least eight 
threshold issues to  assure future institutional linkages  do not  end 
up  in  separation or divorce. 
1. Are present formal arrangements and informal ad hoc 
linkages adequate for arctic ocean  management? The tendency 
for many  academics  and  perhaps  many  diplomats is o look for a 
“quick  fix” to  binational  and  multinational relations through 
the negotiation  of a series of  formal “wedding  vows”  -formal 
treaties and executive  agreements. In fact, many countries are 
content to live in a  “common  law” relationship, where  most 
contacts tend  to  be rather ad hoc and informal. Present  Canadian 
and  American  relations  in  the Arctic are governed mainly  by 
informal  mechanisms  with a slight sprinkling of formal 
agreements. 
On the relatively  informal level, since 1976  U.S. and Cana- 
dian government officials have met in yearly Beaufort Sea 
information exchange sessions. In a 1970 memorandum of 
understanding  (MOU) , the U. S . Department  of Transportation 
and the Canadian  Ministry  of Transportation pledged  to cooper- 
ate in pursuing  scientific  and  technological  research  in the field 
of transportation so as to avoid duplication of parallel national 
efforts. On 25 April 1985 Transport Canada and the U.S. 
Department of Transportation signed a further agreement to 
cooperate in research  projects relating to arctic shipping. In a 
March 1982 memorandum of understanding, the U.S. Coast 
Guard and the Canadian  Department  of  the Environment agreed 
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to cooperate in pollution control research  including behavior of 
oil spilled  in  the  Arctic  and  development  of  pollution response 
equipment. U.S. and  Canadian scientists have cooperated with 
scientists from  other  nations in large-scale research  programs 
such as AIDJEX (Arctic Ice  Dynamics  Joint Experiment) and 
MIZEX (Marginal  Ice  Zone Experiment). At the industry level, 
the Canadian  Arctic  Petroleum Operators Association (APOA) 
and  its  research affiliate, the  Canadian  Offshore Oil Spill 
Research  Association (COOSRA), have  held  yearly  meetings 
with the U.S. Arctic Beaufort Sea Oilspill Research Body 
(ABSORB) to  discuss  oil  pollution  research (Johnston, 1982). 
Numerous other binational contacts no doubt occur, particularly 
at the scientist-to-scientist or official-to-official level. 
National legislation, on occasion, mandates  binational con- 
sultation. For example, the Alaska National Interest Lands 
Conservation  Act  requires  the  Secretary  of Interior to  consult 
with  appropriate  Canadian  agencies in evaluating impacts  of oil 
and gas development and transportation activities on North 
Slope wildlife resources, including polar bear, seabirds, and 
caribou. 
At a more  formal level, a Canada-United States Joint Marine 
Pollution Contingency Plan for the Beaufort Sea establishes 
procedures for the U.S. Coast  Guard  and  the Canadian Coast 
Guard to jointly respond  to  any  oil or noxious substance 
pollution  incident  threatening the waters or coastal areas  of  both 
parties. In 1972, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. signed  an  Agreement 
on Cooperation  in  the  Field of Environmental Protection, which 
pledged the two  countries  to cooperate, among other things, in 
studying arctic ecological systems  and to exchange information 
on marine pollution prevention facets such as vessel design, 
traffic control, shore facilities, and offshore oil drilling safe- 
guards. Canada  has  recently  signed a scientific research cooper- 
ation agreement with the U.S.S.R., and on 26 August 1983 
Canada  and  Denmark  signed a Marine Environment  Coopera- 
tion  Agreement  covering  the  Nares Strait, Baffin Bay, Davis 
Strait region. The Canada-Denmark agreement establishes joint 
contingency plans for shipping  or seabed  pollution incidents, 
sets forth the duty  to  consult  on activities creating a significant 
risk of  transboundary pollution, pledges cooperation in  marine 
scientific research, and  mandates cooperation in  vessel traffic 
management  and in identifying appropriate vessel routing areas. 
Much can be said in favor of the present ad hoc mix of 
informal and formal cooperation in the Arctic. Government 
administrators enjoy the ultimate in flexibility. Unbound by 
numerous  treaty requirements, they  may  simply establish coop- 
erative bridges as needed.  Until resource  development scenarios 
become clarified, arctic states may  not  be able to justify finan- 
cial and  manpower  commitments  beyond ad hoc, incremental 
cooperation. On  the  negative side, lack of  an integrated ocean 
management  system for the Arctic could result in little long- 
range planning, fragmented research and development pro- 
grams,  and, thus, greater financial, social, and environmental 
costs in the long run. 
2. Assuming the U.S. and  Canada do wish  to establish more 
formal  cooperative  mechanisms, should  they  make only  mini- 
mal  commitments  to cooperate through a demonstrative agree- 
ment  (an  agreement  demonstrating  good intentions to consult 
and cooperate), or should  they  make  more substantial commit- 
ments  through a combination  of  more laborate agreements? An 
administrative agreement  might establish specific administra- 
tive arrangements, for example a joint Beaufort Sea Advisory 
Commission, for managing ocean uses. A distributive agree- 
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ment  might  formalize  the  exchange (or distribution) of scientific 
information and technological expertise. A resolutive agree- 
ment might resolve outstanding issues such as the Beaufort 
marine  boundary (Johnston, 1981). 
A demonstrative  treaty offers to  bestow two  advantages. It 
would likely be politically attractive since no great national 
commitments  would  be  required  by either country. It would also 
give differing management  regimes  time  to  adjust to one another. 
On  the  negative side, an  agreement  limited to expressing good 
intentions  could  encourage  abundant international talk  but little 
concrete action. 
3. Assuming the U.S. and Canada wish to establish more 
formal  mechanisms for arctic  marine management, what level 
of cooperation - binational, trinational, arctic-wide, or global 
- is  required  and  politically feasible? Arctic marine issues are 
often susceptible  to  management on varying levels. For exam- 
ple, arctic shipping might require management at the arctic- 
wide (or arctic-wide plus  major shipping state) level to assure a 
uniform system of vessel specifications, such as design and 
equipment,  for the day  could  come  when  a  single  ice- 
strengthened  vessel  would  ply the Northwest Passage, the North 
Pole route, and  the  Northeast  Passage  on a multipurpose ship- 
ping assignment. If a vessel’s route were  limited to the North- 
west  Passage region, including  Canadian  waters to the east and 
U.S. waters  to the west, a bilateral  agreement between the U.S. 
and  Canada  might be sufficient to protect vessel owners  from 
conflicting regulations. However, if a ship were  to transit the 
West  Greenland  waters as a Northwest Passage entry way or 
exit, a trinational agreement might be necessary among the 
U.S.,  Canada, and  DenmarWGreenland.  Given the stiff opposi- 
tion  of  Greenlanders to the Arctic  Pilot Project, a proposal  by 
Petro-Canada  to ship liquefied natural  gas  by Class 7 icebreak- 
ers through  the  Northwest  Passage to Eastern Canada  or  Europe, 
a trilateral agreement might be an extremely difficult and 
sensitive issue. The question  must also be  addressed  whether the 
shipping mode for hydrocarbon transport is an appropriate 
choice for the Arctic, given strong native opposition and the 
pipeline alternatives. 
Since the Beaufort Sea is a closely shared body of water 
between  the U.S. and Canada,  a bilateral management regime 
seems logical. However, the bowhead  whale migrates to Soviet 
waters, so a trilateral  arrangement for managing marine mam- 
mals  might  be  called for. 
4. Should  the  two  countries create new binational manage- 
ment institutions and approaches, or should they emphasize 
harmonization  of existing legislation and administration? As  an 
example of  this  type  of  policy question, the U.S. and Canada 
might  seek to create a new  institution for assessing the environ- 
mental consequences of major offshore and onshore  develop- 
ments, or the countries could simply harmonize their own 
domestic  processes to assure domestic  environmental  reviews 
fully consider the transboundary implications of project propos- 
als. Harmonization  of domestic legislation might require domes- 
tic environmental review entities, such as the National  Energy 
Board, environmental assessment panels, and U.S. counter- 
parts, to give notice of proceedings to interested foreign resi- 
dents and  relevant foreign governmental departments  and allow 
intervention by such parties. Environmental review entities 
might also be authorized to fund foreign interventions and 
perhaps to hold  public  hearings  in another  country, if agreeable 
to both governments. 
5 .  Assuming the U.S. and  Canada agree to create new arctic 
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marine  management institution(s), how  should  they  design their 
joint institution(s)? At  the one  extreme, the U.S. and  Canada 
could create a multifunctional  management commission, that is, 
a “super-commission” with some say over all arctic marine 
uses, including  marine  mammal harvesting, fisheries develop- 
ment, navigation, oil and  gas activities, and  habitat protection. 
At the other  extreme, they could establish one  or more 
unifunctional  commissions for coordinating single ocean uses. 
Thus, there  might  be  one  commission for managing shared fish 
stocks, one for managing  vessel traffic, and another for oversee- 
ing  offshore  oil  and gas  development. 
Each extreme bears positive attributes. A multifunctional 
approach  promises to maximize comprehensive integrated plan- 
ning and to streamline decision making, since all functions 
would be handled under a single institutional umbrella. A 
unifunctional approach,  meanwhile, might  be  more politically 
attractive, since both countries would only have to incremen- 
tally commit themselves to the  most demanding  ocean problems 
rather than  having  to take a total  plunge into untested, compre- 
hensive  ocean  management. 
6. Assuming  new arctic marine  management institution(s) are 
created, what kind of powers should be given to the joint 
institution(s)? Advisory only?  Or actual decision making?  The 
greater the decision-making power, the greater the political 
paranoia is likely to be, for the national executives and  bureau- 
cracies are bound  to  be  wary  of l sing powers to an international 
body. Political opposition  might  be curbed,  however, by leav- 
ing decision making as far as possible with the responsible 
government  agencies  in each country. Such might  be  accom- 
plished  by  matching international institutional membership with 
responsible agency memberships. 
7. What role should  native  groups  play  in regionalized arctic 
marine  management?  Given the cultural importance of sea ice 
and  marine  mammal  harvesting  to Inuit communities, the U.S. 
and Canada might consider at least partially following the 
example of  Australia  and  Papua  New Guinea, which in settling 
maritime jurisdiction over the Torres Strait region agreed to 
establish a special protection zone for preserving traditional 
lifestyles of  local inhabitants. 
If actual decision-making  powers  were  to  be granted to arctic 
marine  management institutions, then native northerners, based 
on arguments for human rights and cultural continuity, might 
claim  a right  to  participate  in actual decision making as well. 
8. What  type  of dispute settlement mechanism(s)  should the 
U. S .  and  Canada establish for resolving arctic marine issues? At 
least three sub-questions arise as to binational settlement of 
arctic marine  issues: 
a. Is any dispute settlement mechanism required at all? 
While lack of outside binding settlement procedures would 
arguably induce both countries to avoid tough management 
decisions, the opposite  could also be true. Forcing officials to 
resolve basic differences by internal negotiations  could facili- 
tate management decisions, for officials would face a  “do or 
die” situation: either resolve basic differences or  reach no joint 
management. 
b.  What level of dispute settlement is preferable for arctic 
marine  issues: a  chamber of the International Court of Justice? 
submission for arbitration or recommendation  by the Interna- 
tional Joint Commission, the joint six-member  body created by 
the 1909 Boundary Waters  Treaty?  submission to general 
settlement mechanisms still to be created by the U.S. and 
Canada (for example, an overall Canadian-American Environ- 
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mental  Dispute  Tribunal)?  creation of a settlement  mechanism 
specific  to  arctic  marine  issues  (for example, an  Arctic  Marine 
Ad Hoc  Tribunal)?  or  adoption of the dispute settlement  proce- 
dures  of the Law of the Sea Convention, including  reference to 
the  International  Tribunal for the Law  of  the Sea? 
c. Should dispute settlement references occur only by 
mutual consent, or should either party be allowed  to  unilaterally 
request a reference? 
CONCLUSION 
The need  for  Canadian-American  cooperation  in the Arctic  is 
essential to prevent transboundary pollution incidents in the 
Beaufort, to manage overlapping living resources, including 
marine  mammals  and  fish stocks, to  protect  the  culture of native 
northerners, and to increase technological understanding and 
capabilities.  Legal  and  ethical  mandates  to  cooperate are empha- 
sized in such documents as the World Conservation Strategy 
and  the  Law  of  the Sea Convention. However, the  legal  status of 
arctic  waters  remains  clouded  in  uncertainty  and the national 
capabilities to manage ocean development remain cloaked in 
fragmentation  and  political tension. 
Whether Canadian-American relations in the Arctic have 
been  riding  in  the ye of a storm or at the edge of a tranquil sea 
will  likely  depend  on  renewed  national  commitments  to cooper- 
ate  in  ocean  development  and  management. 
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